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BOOK REVIEW 
ORIGINAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM 
GARY LAWSON∗ 
Two of the most doctrinally bewildering topics in American constitutional 
law are federalism and foreign affairs. Put the two together and it requires the 
patience of Job and the wisdom of Solomon to navigate, never mind make sense 
of, the judicial and political accommodations that have arisen over the course of 
more than two centuries concerning the relative roles of the national, state, and 
local governments in matters that implicate American involvement with foreign 
countries and citizens. I will not go so far as to say that Mike Glennon and Rob 
Sloane’s new book, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National 
Exclusivity,1 is biblical in either ambition or execution. But it is a very, very 
good book. It is close to indispensable for anyone who is trying to parse the 
interstices of such underanalyzed topics as foreign affairs preemption, the 
Compact Clause, and federal common law. It contains powerful and useful 
analyses of the law governing the federal treaty power. The book even has 
concise but sophisticated discussions of ancillary topics ranging from Founding-
era conceptions of federalism to modern modes of constitutional interpretation. 
The book’s breadth and erudition are truly remarkable. I am delighted for the 
opportunity to provide this brief review. 
It is tempting simply to offer congratulations to the authors and move on. That 
may even be the wise course of action, given the rather large gap between the 
authors’ knowledge of foreign affairs federalism and my own; in that field, I am 
at best an interested observer and at worst a dilettante. But I will try to find 
something critical—or at least analytical—to say, if only to try to draw forth 
further discussion from the authors. 
The authors’ self-identified aims in the book are fourfold: (1) “to describe 
what states and cities in fact do in the realm of foreign affairs,” (2) “to explain 
the basic principles of the Constitution that authorize or limit those activities,” 
(3) “to assess how well those principles reflect and conform to actual practice,” 
 
∗ Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This review stems 
from comments delivered at a symposium held on September 19, 2016 at Boston University 
School of Law. I am grateful to Mike Glennon, Sandy Levinson, and Rob Sloane for 
invaluable feedback on those comments. 
1 MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH 
OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016). 
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and (4) “to suggest how, if at all, those principles might usefully be modified.”2 
That really amounts to five aims because the third aim requires both 
identification of actual practices, which is in fact the book’s primary focus, and 
a comparison of those practices with specified constitutional principles. 
I have nothing useful, beyond effusive praise, to say about the authors’ 
execution of their first aim. They have painstakingly catalogued an enormous 
spread of activities of state and local governments that, in one sense or another, 
involve foreign affairs, ranging from congressionally approved compacts, to 
local “buy only” policies, to the establishment of foreign trade offices, to what 
Bill O’Reilly would term “bloviating”3 resolutions of approval or disapproval of 
various federal policies. Perhaps the authors missed something important along 
the way, but I can’t think of it. The book is worth the price of admission for 
Chapters 2 and 10 alone, which set out in great detail the range of relevant state 
and local activities. I also have nothing useful to say about their last, prescriptive 
aim, because suggesting modifications to real-world practices is a normative 
enterprise, and I have a generally firm policy of trying to stay away from 
normative enterprises in scholarship. I will try, however, to say something 
useful, or at the very least provocative, about the authors’ other aims. 
I. “TO EXPLAIN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT 
AUTHORIZE OR LIMIT THOSE [STATE AND LOCAL] ACTIVITIES”: WHICH 
CONSTITUTION? 
The opening pages of Foreign Affairs Federalism contain a great many 
references to “the Framers.”4 Fans of the eighteenth century will find 
considerable discussion in Chapter 1 of theories of federalism and republicanism 
that influenced the Founding5 and a catalogue of original constitutional 
provisions that seem to address federalism, foreign affairs, or both.6 Yet, after 
this seemingly Framer-friendly beginning, the book’s subsequent 300-plus 
pages contain very little discussion of anything that someone like me would call, 
or recognize as, the Constitution’s original meaning. 
That omission is hardly an accident. Glennon and Sloane are not originalists; 
the book’s brief but admirably lucid explanation of the authors’ 
functionalist/pragmatist constitutional methodology makes that abundantly 
 
2 Id. at 351; see also id. at 77 (setting out much of the book’s descriptive and normative 
agenda). 
3 Factor Words of the Day: Bloviate, BILLO’REILLY.COM (Sept. 6, 2006), 
http://www.billoreilly.com/b/bloviate/46515669028.html [https://perma.cc/EYE8-X3D7] 
(defining “bloviate” as “to speak pompously”). 
4 See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 1 (“Some of the Framers of the 
Constitution and their countrymen apparently believed that they were the first free agents to 
design a new government.”). 
5 Id. at 2-15. 
6 Id. at 16-21. 
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clear.7 That stance does not afford valid grounds for criticism of the authors, 
even if one thinks (as I do) that originalism is the uniquely correct way to 
ascertain the Constitution’s meaning.8 Glennon and Sloane correctly note that 
there is no way that a book of this sort could possibly include a detailed treatment 
of constitutional methodology, even if the authors were inclined (as they are not) 
to lay out a systematic, foundationally grounded methodological approach.9 
They have done here as much as they reasonably could do—and more than many 
authors choose to do—by articulating and identifying their methodology so that 
readers can openly appraise the book’s analytical and normative enterprises. A 
straight-on critique of the authors’ interpretative methodology would thus be 
neither fair nor relevant, and I offer nothing of the sort here. 
I do point out, however, that the authors’ eclectic and pragmatic approach 
gives rise to a potential ambiguity that calls out for clarification. When the 
authors discuss eclectic functionalist principles drawn from 
“[h]istory . . . [,] practice, precedent, tradition, political theory, structure, and 
other methodological tools,”10 are they really discussing something that can 
meaningfully be labeled constitutional principles? 
The answer, as a former president might say, depends on what the meaning 
of “constitutional” is. If by “constitutional principles” one means those 
principles that, for more than 200 years, have driven actual decisions by real-
world political actors, including but not limited to Supreme Court Justices, then 
of course all of the considerations just listed are part of that set of principles. The 
authors are indisputably correct to note that “[n]o one method describes the 
uniform preference of the Court as a whole, or even that of a particular Supreme 
Court justice,”11 and a broad list of considerations is an apt description of real-
world legal practice. But if “constitutional principles” instead just are the 
principles contained in the Constitution itself rather than principles contained in 
the practices of people whose actions are only contingently related to the 
document, it is far from clear that anything other than the text, informed by 
background principles that are appropriate for discerning the communicative 
signals of that particular kind of text, is relevant for ascertaining those 
principles.12 
 
7 Id. at 78-81; see also id. at 21 (“[J]udges and commentators, no less than the Framers, 
have recognized the need to identify the functions that institutions created or presupposed by 
the Constitution, including the several states, were intended to serve—and to consider whether 
and how particular interpretations of the text either advance or undermine those functions.”). 
8 See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This 
Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2016) (“[S]ome form of originalism just has to be 
the right method for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution.”). 
9 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 77. 
10 Id. at 21. 
11 Id. at 80. 
12 Could practice, tradition, precedent, and the like in theory be among the background 
principles for discerning the communicative signals of a particular kind of document? Of 
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I do not claim that there is a uniquely appropriate referent for the term 
“constitutional principles.” People can use “constitutional principles” to mean 
anything that they would like, provided that the term is clearly defined. The risk 
is equivocation. Some meanings of the term carry implications or 
connotations—either communicative or rhetorical—that may not apply to other 
meanings. For example, by starting off the book with an extensive discussion of 
Founding-era ideas, Glennon and Sloane might (even if incorrectly) be thought 
to be conveying the notion that they are linking, however remotely or indirectly, 
the term “constitutional principles” to something resembling original meaning. 
That is reinforced by their suggestion that “no one regards the original meaning 
of the text as irrelevant to constitutional interpretation and adjudication.”13 On 
further reading and reflection, of course, the dearth of subsequent discussion of 
original meaning and the book’s strong focus on history and consequences make 
clear that original meaning is at best a bit player in the authors’ story. The initial 
impression of concern for the Founding era, though, never quite goes away 
entirely. Accordingly, it might be useful for the authors to clarify just how 
relevant they consider original meaning (however the authors understand that 
term) to be to their various enterprises,14 and to spell out more clearly what they 
consider to be the referent of the term “the Constitution.” Is “the Constitution” 
a historically situated document? A set of practices? A normative construct? 
That kind of clarification is especially pertinent, as I will now show, to the 
authors’ third aim and its implicit fourth accompanying aim. 
II. “TO ASSESS HOW WELL THOSE PRINCIPLES REFLECT AND CONFORM TO 
ACTUAL PRACTICE”: WHICH PRINCIPLES ARE “THOSE”? 
In order to compare any set of principles, constitutional or otherwise, to actual 
practice, one must first describe that practice. The bulk of Foreign Affairs 
Federalism is accordingly devoted to describing the actual practice of political 
actors, including judicial actors within that category, with respect to the relative 
roles of national, state, and local governments in foreign affairs. This is really 
the book’s central mission, and it is the book’s greatest achievement. In addition 
to the catalogue of state and local activity in Chapters 2 and 10, one can find 
 
course they could in theory. Are they in fact among the background principles for discerning 
the communicative signals of the Constitution? That is an empirical question. I think not, but 
it is a topic for another time. 
13 Id. at 79. I am not at all sure about the “no one” part. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 15-22 (2012) (presenting ten arguments in favor of 
constitutional obedience, arguing that all of them fail, and concluding that there is “a problem 
with constitutional obedience”). But many, and perhaps even most, people give at least lip 
service to the idea of original meaning. 
14 It might have very different relevance to different enterprises. For example, one might 
consider original meaning highly relevant to an interpretative project but minimally relevant, 
or even not relevant at all, to a normative project—or vice versa. See Gary Lawson, 
Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2013). 
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throughout the book extensive discussions of federal case law and (in a welcome 
display of breadth) presidential and congressional practice regarding national-
state relations in regard to foreign affairs. Those discussions are, independently 
of Chapters 2 and 10, well worth the price of admission, and they more than 
amply justify the book on their own. Indeed, they appear to be the book’s main 
raison d’être. Accordingly, any criticisms in the rest of this review of the book’s 
analytical elements are somewhat beside the point. 
The authors, however, seek to go a bit further than description of practices to 
assess the extent to which those real-world practices regarding foreign affairs 
federalism are consistent with constitutional principles, whatever those turn out 
to be. It is therefore fair to ask whether the book, on its own terms, successfully 
compares principles to practice. 
Again, it depends very much on which principles and which practices one has 
in mind. Here is where the book’s eclectic methodology makes analysis, and 
understanding, very difficult. How does one know in any given circumstances 
which of a wide range of principles to compare to actual practice? What is the 
baseline against which practice is to be judged in any given context? A 
nonfoundationalist methodology, by its nature, has no real way to answer this 
kind of question. And a critical analyst has no way to determine the book’s 
success or failure in this regard without conducting an exhaustive analysis that 
runs through every possible principle and every existing practice and/or by 
imposing the analyst’s own favored principles on the authors. I would be curious 
to know if the authors can offer any clarification that will make assessment of 
their comparisons of practice to principles easier. More specifically: How do 
they themselves evaluate the success or failure of particular arguments in this 
vein? Inquiring minds want to know, and the book does not really provide a clear 
answer. 
It is also at this point that the book’s relative neglect of original meaning has 
its biggest impact. One possible analytical comparison, after all, is between 
practice and original meaning (with no implication intended here either that this 
is the most important comparison or about which of those elements is to prevail 
in the event of conflict). If it is really true, or at least mostly true, that “no one 
regards the original meaning of the text as irrelevant to constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication,”15 it might be valuable to see the extent to which 
current practices conform to that particular principle. The authors spend 
relatively little energy on that exercise. That might make a good measure of 
sense in light of their own methodological commitments, but those who think 
that original meaning contributes at all to legal meaning16 might have found it 
helpful to hear a bit more about how original meaning and contemporary practice 
relate (or do not relate) to each other. Accordingly, I will briefly highlight here 
two issues of major contemporary importance involving federalism and foreign 
 
15 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 79; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
16 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 953-54 (2009) (describing the “contribution thesis”). 
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affairs in which original meaning and practice diverge dramatically in a way that 
Foreign Affairs Federalism does not convey. 
The book’s longest chapter (albeit by only a few pages) is Chapter 6, in which 
the authors set forth their conception of the federal treaty power and the 
restraints—or, in their view, the lack thereof—on that power imposed by 
constitutional principles of federalism.17 They offer a 
functionalist/consequentialist defense18 of Missouri v. Holland,19 and lament its 
implicit overruling20 by Bond v. United States.21 They do not, however, tell the 
reader just how far removed is Holland from the original meaning of the treaty 
power—even if only to dismiss the originalist conception as, in their view, 
unworkable or undesirable. From an originalist standpoint, Holland ranks 
among the most bizarre decisions in the Court’s long and sordid history. 
Holland, one will recall, involved congressional legislation regulating 
migratory birds pursuant to the terms of a treaty with the United Kingdom.22 It 
was settled law at that time that, absent a treaty, Congress had no enumerated 
power, under the Commerce Clause or anything else, to regulate migratory 
birds.23 The question was whether Congress could gain a legislative power that 
it did not otherwise possess by virtue of presidential and senatorial enactment of 
a federal treaty.24 The Court famously said yes, in an opinion by Justice 
Holmes.25 
 
17 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 185-246. 
18 Id. at 193-205. 
19 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
20 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 186, 205-21. 
21 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
22 Holland, 252 U.S. at 430-32. 
23 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-31 (1896) (holding Congress could not 
constitutionally regulate migratory birds under the Commerce Clause and upholding a 
Connecticut statute prohibiting the sale of migratory birds outside the state); United States v. 
McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294-96 (D. Kan. 1915) (finding a provision of the Weaks-McLean 
Act, through which Congress regulated the killing of migratory birds, unconstitutional); 
United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (same). 
24 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (describing the argument the Court faced as asserting “that a 
treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the 
treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do 
unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do”). 
25 Id. at 435. Justice Holmes is widely admired in American legal circles. See, e.g., ALBERT 
W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 
14-15 (2000) (noting praise for Justice Holmes among jurists, legal scholars, law schools, law 
reviews, as well as in popular culture); Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in 
American Legal Thought, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 31, 31 (Robert 
W. Gordon ed., 1992) (“There has been only one great American legal thinker and it was 
Holmes.”); Richard A. Posner, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at ix (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (referring to Justice Holmes as “the 
most illustrious figure in the history of American law”); Benjamin N. Cardozo, Tribute, Mr. 
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There are two crucial respects in which Holland undercuts or ignores original 
constitutional meaning. The most blatant respect is the casual assumption in the 
decision that Congress has any enumerated power to implement or execute the 
substantive terms of a treaty. As a general matter, it rather plainly does not. 
Congress has a set of enumerated powers. If a treaty can be implemented 
through use of those otherwise enumerated powers, there is no problem; the 
enumerated powers are sufficient to support the implementing legislation 
without regard to the treaty. Treaties involving foreign trade, for example, can 
surely be implemented through the congressional power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations.26 The question is what happens when, as in the case of 
Holland, those powers are insufficient by themselves to allow congressional 
action.27 The standard answer, which was assumed but not argued by the Court 
in Holland,28 is that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to 
implement the terms of federal treaties once they are ratified. The standard 
answer has a surface plausibility. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives 
Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof.”29 The treaty power, identified in Article II,30 is among the 
“other Powers vested by this Constitution,” so doesn’t Congress clearly have the 
power to carry the treaty power into execution? Yes, of course it does. The trick, 
however, is to understand what it means to carry a power, such as the treaty 
power, into execution. 
As Nick Rosenkranz has elegantly demonstrated at length, it does not mean 
to make the results of the exercise of that power as effective or efficient as they 
might be.31 It means to make possible or to facilitate the exercise of the power 
in the first place. In the case of treaties, it would “carry[] into Execution” the 
treaty power to authorize the hiring of personnel to help draft and negotiate the 
 
Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 684 (1931) (describing Justice Holmes as “the greatest 
of our age in the domain of jurisprudence”). For a revisionist look at Justice Holmes that 
seriously questions this legacy, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Chief Justice John Roberts’s Dissent in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 8 ELON L. REV. 1 (2016). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
27 Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence would sustain the legislation at issue in 
Holland, but as of 1920 the Court had not yet abandoned the Constitution wholesale. 
28 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (“If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute 
the powers of the Government.”). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
30 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur”). 
31 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 
1937-38 (2005). 
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treaty, to appropriate funds to transport officials to and fro, to create a 
government printing office to ready the necessary documents, and so forth. But 
once the treaty exists, the treaty power—the power to “make Treaties”—has 
been fully exercised, and there is nothing more for the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to do with respect to that power. As Justice Scalia put it: “Once a treaty 
has been made, Congress’s power to do what is ‘necessary and proper’ to assist 
the making of treaties drops out of the picture.”32 The Necessary and Proper 
Clause by its terms gives Congress power to execute the treaty power, not power 
to execute treaties.33 To be sure, the treaty at that point (assuming that the treaty 
is valid, and more on that in a moment) creates law, and the President’s 
“executive Power”34 permits him to execute the treaty, and the Take Care 
Clause35 actually obligates him to do so. It would therefore be appropriate for 
Congress to pass laws to help the President execute the terms of the treaty. 
Again, however, that power would only extend as far as the terms of the treaty 
extend of their own force. Put another way, the long-debated distinction between 
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is, from a constitutional 
standpoint, no debate at all. All treaties are and must be self-executing because 
there is no general constitutional power on the part of Congress to execute their 
terms once the treaty is enacted as law. 
The only possible end-run around this is to argue that a power to implement 
the terms of a treaty through legislation is somehow an incident to the power to 
make treaties, and thus is carried by the treaty power even without textual 
specification. That is simply not going to work as an argument, however, 
because the power to legislate beyond enumerated powers by virtue of a treaty 
is the quintessential “great substantive and independent power” that cannot be 
an incident.36 
 
32 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
33 See id. at 2098-99; Nick Rosenkranz, There Is No Textual Foundation for the Claim that 
Treaties Can Increase the Power of Congress, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 
3:31 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/01/16/there-is-no-textual-foundation-for-the-claim-that-
treaties-can-increase-the-power-of-congress/ [https://perma.cc/JQQ7-BP2G]. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
35 Id. § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
36 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819). For a detailed discussion 
of the doctrine of principal and incidental powers in the context of the Constitution, see GARY 
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE 
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2017). An even more attenuated (desperate?) 
argument might try to say that congressional implementation of a treaty could make it easier 
to negotiate treaties in the future and, in that respect, would be “carrying into Execution” the 
treaty power. That kind of argument immediately founders on the requirement that any such 
laws be “necessary and proper.” As an original matter, Rube Goldberg chains of causation are 
neither. 
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But what to do with a treaty that promises, as part of its terms, that the United 
States will pass laws of a certain kind that go beyond the enumerated powers of 
Congress absent the treaty? The answer is the same as in the case of a treaty that 
promises, as part of its terms, that certain states will be denied their equal voice 
in the Senate or that the United States government will nationalize all media 
sources. It is entirely possible for the President and Senate to ratify a treaty that 
has no domestic legal force. That may be a spectacularly dumb move, given the 
international ramifications of treaty violations, but there is nothing in the 
Constitution that forbids the President and Senate from making spectacularly 
dumb moves that generate international crises. Their dumb moves, however, do 
not confer powers on Congress that it does not have.37 That may well mean, as 
I suspect Glennon and Sloane will maintain, that a great many treaties that many 
people think would be good policy are therefore beyond the power of the 
national government to enact.38 From the standpoint of original meaning, the 
simple answer is: “que sera, sera.”39 (Or, if one prefers poker to Hitchcock: “read 
‘em and weep.”) A great many statutes that many people think might be good 
policy crumble as well on the walls of bicameralism or presentment.40 That 
possibility does not make Article I, Section 7 disappear. 
It would have been eminently possible to enumerate a freestanding 
congressional power to implement the substantive terms of treaties. It might 
even have been a wise power to enumerate. However, the Constitution simply 
does not enumerate such a power. The absence, as a matter of original meaning, 
of congressional power to execute treaties, as opposed to the power to execute 
the treaty power, is the biggest gap between the Constitution and Holland, and 
it receives no sustained attention in Foreign Affairs Federalism. 
There is a second constitutional problem with Holland from the standpoint of 
original meaning. Glennon and Sloane correctly point out that the long line of 
attempts, repeated most recently by Justice Thomas in Bond,41 to find some kind 
of subject matter limitation on treaties is textually quite difficult to support.42 
 
37 See Rosenkranz, supra note 33. 
38 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 244 (“To have found a Tenth Amendment 
impediment to a treaty regulating migratory waterfowl would have denied the federal 
government the authority to make that agreement. It would have required would-be treaty 
partners to negotiate with the forty-eight states of the Union instead—forty-eight different 
negotiations, state by state. That cannot be the system established by the Framers under the 
Constitution.”). 
39 DORIS DAY, Whatever Will Be, Will Be (Que Sera, Sera), on [Catalog Number 40704] 
(Columbia Records 1956) (appearing originally in Alfred Hitchcock’s The Man Who Knew 
Too Much). 
40 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President 
of the United States . . . .”). 
41 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077,  2103-08 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
42 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 195, 197. 
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But there is another kind of limitation on treaties that is implicit both in the 
Treaty Clause and in the entire structure of Article II of the Constitution: treaties 
may only carry into execution other federal powers. The treaty power is not a 
freestanding authorization to the President and Congress to extend federal 
influence into areas not enumerated by the Constitution. Instead, it is a vehicle 
for allowing those already existing powers to be leveraged into binding 
international agreements. Guy Seidman and I have made the (somewhat hesitant, 
deeply qualified, and considerably weaker than knock-down-drag-out) case for 
this proposition at execrable length elsewhere,43 and I will not repeat the 
argument here. Nor can I reasonably fault Glennon and Sloane for not addressing 
that argument in their book; it is sufficiently out of the mainstream, even within 
originalist circles,44 so that it can safely be ignored in a work focused on doctrine 
and real-world governance. But an originalist account of the treaty power must 
acknowledge it as yet another (at least potential) gap between Holland and the 
Constitution. Holland may or may not be good constitutional policy; that is well 
beyond my pay grade. Following it may or may not make for good constitutional 
adjudication; see the previous sentence. But it is very bad constitutional 
interpretation. 
There is a second topic on which Glennon and Sloane actually note, and then 
largely pass over, the enormous gap between modern practice and original 
constitutional meaning: federal regulation of immigration. The Constitution 
actually gives Congress no significant power over immigration. Virtually every 
modern federal law on the subject is very likely wildly unconstitutional. Glennon 
and Sloane are right on top of this. They observe that “[t]he Constitution says 
almost nothing about immigration. Article I authorizes Congress ‘[t]o establish 
a uniform rule of naturalization.’ That’s all. Like many other foreign affairs 
powers, the federal immigration power has consequently developed over time 
on the basis of multiple sources beyond the text of the Constitution.”45 In other 
words, the Court simply made up a federal immigration power, in an era (the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) when it was making up a whole 
raft of powers,46 ranging from eminent domain to conscription, based on 
“inferences from America’s status as an independent nation and alleged 
incidents of sovereignty under international law.”47 If Montenegro, Russia, and 
 
43 See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1. 
44 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 208 n.50 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland 
and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 969, 1001-04 (2008). 
45 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 301-02 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 4). 
46 For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
47 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 1, at 89 (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2498 (2012)). For perhaps the most egregious example of this kind of reasoning, see 
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South Africa do it, then surely, so goes this argument, the Constitution must let 
Congress do it as well. This was a wretchedly bad interpretation of the 
Constitution at the time, especially in the context of immigration; “[t]here 
is . . . little reason to believe that the Framers contemplated creating a federal 
immigration power.”48 
The interpretation has not improved with age. Ilya Somin has recently reached 
the same conclusion in a much longer and more detailed analysis of the issue.49 
Along the way, Somin considers and trenchantly rejects a bevy of possible 
sources of a federal constitutional power over immigration, ranging from the 
Commerce Clause to the Define and Punish Clause.50 It is quite clear, as it was 
clear to the nineteenth-century Supreme Court that invented a congressional 
immigration power out of whole cloth, that the Constitution says nothing about 
immigration. And if the Constitution says nothing about immigration, then 
Congress, which relies upon the Constitution for its enumerated powers, can do 
nothing about immigration. 
So what is the actual constitutional scheme for immigration regulation? It 
quite plainly puts principal authority with the states—as Albert Gallatin noted at 
a quite early date.51 Each state can choose who it does and does not allow across 
its borders, subject only to the constraints of international law, the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause,52 and, at least after 1868, of generalized 
norms found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The states, however, 
cannot unilaterally confer United States citizenship on aliens. That power 
belongs to Congress under the Naturalization Clause.54 States can control the 
 
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1918). 
48 Cleveland, supra note 46, at 81. 
49 See Ilya Somin, Immigration and the Constitution 2 (Aug. 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
50 See id. at 4-22 (discussing, and ultimately rejecting, the Commerce Clause, the 
Naturalization Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Migration or Importation Clause, 
and the Define and Punish Clause as bases for immigration restrictions). 
51 See Cleveland, supra note 46, at 88-89 (discussing Congressman Gallatin’s objections 
to the Alien Act of 1798 as unconstitutional). 
52 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
53 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”). Somin sees substantially more potential limitations on state action in this area 
stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment than do I, but that is a tale for another time. See 
Somin, supra note 49, at 26-31. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”). 
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flow of persons across their borders, but power over the consequences of that 
flow is partly vested in the national government. 
Does that mean that a President and Congress committed to enforcing border 
security could not constitutionally build “an impenetrable physical wall on the 
southern border,” even if that would be sensible and desirable policy?55 That is 
actually a much more interesting question than it might at first seem. 
The answer begins with the intramural debate between Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas in Zivotofsky v. Kerry56 over the federal power to issue and 
control passports: Justice Scalia maintained that Congress easily had power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement its authority over 
naturalization through the use of passports to establish the identity of United 
States nationals.57 Justice Thomas, by contrast, expressed grave doubts about the 
existence of that congressional power.58 In part, those doubts stem from Justice 
Thomas’s belief that the President’s “executive Power”59 gives him power over 
passports,60 so that any claimed inferential congressional authority in the area 
would be flying in the face of a constitutional grant of power to the President.61 
Justice Scalia, in turn, expressed doubts about such a presidential power.62 
Assume for the moment that Justice Thomas is correct that the “executive 
Power” is a grant of power broad enough to include a presidential power over 
passports.63 Might such an “executive Power” also extend to control over the 
flow of persons into the United States? I am dubious about the grounding of any 
such general power as a matter of original meaning, but it is at least a theoretical 
possibility. Much more plausible, however, is the idea that such a power exists, 
but only exists, during wartime.64 The “executive Power” is significantly more 
expansive during wartime than during peacetime;65 among other things, the 
 
55 Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016, 
10:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-
transcript-227614 [https://perma.cc/WH3V-XBZC]. 
56 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
57 Id. at 2117, 2123-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 2108-09 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
60 Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2101-03 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61 See id. at 2103-07. 
62 See id. at 2124-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
63 Justice Thomas is clearly (I think) correct that, at the very least, Article II’s Vesting 
Clause is a grant of power to the President. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 43, at 22-43. 
The scope of the granted power is another matter altogether. I have no considered view here 
about whether that grant of power extends as far as Justice Thomas thinks it extends. 
64 See Somin, supra note 49, at 26 (“As with Congress, the president can use his powers 
to restrict the entry of some subset of foreigners. Most obviously, his power as commander-
in-chief of the armed forces gives him the authority to block the movement of enemy armies, 
spies, and similar threats to national security, particularly in wartime.”). 
65 See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times 
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President during wartime has the power, and even duty, to govern foreign 
territory occupied by United States forces, while any such claim of power during 
peacetime would be impeachable.66 Does the President’s wartime “executive 
Power” include the power to exclude aliens in the interests of national security? 
And would Congress therefore have power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to pass appropriate implementing legislation to help execute that 
presidential power? 
Those are questions that would require a separate article, and more likely a 
separate book, even to begin to address. But if such a presidential power is at all 
plausible, then perhaps one needs to ask as well whether the United States is 
presently at war. Certainly, there has been no formal declaration of war, but one 
school of thought holds that states of war exist or do not exist independently of 
congressional recognition of them through declarations.67 On that reasoning, it 
is quite possible for the United States to be at war, and for the President therefore 
to have wartime “executive Power,” even in the absence of a congressional 
declaration. 
If all of the relevant premises—(1) the Constitution contains a grant of 
“executive Power,” (2) “executive Power” includes some foreign affairs powers, 
(3) those foreign affairs powers include some control over borders, (4) 
“executive Power” is broader in wartime, and (5) the United States is at war—
are true, then perhaps the President, and the President with Congress—assuming 
that any such legislation is “necessary and proper” for carrying that presidential 
power into execution—can take action to control America’s borders. In that 
case, one would have to reconcile such presidential power with the undoubted 
residual power of the states to control their own borders. Could Texas admit a 
foreign national that the President wanted to exclude? 
These are the sorts of questions that would have to be addressed if one were 
actually trying to figure out what the Constitution says about immigration. They 
bear no resemblance to the sorts of questions that are asked under current 
doctrine. To be clear: I do not at all fault Glennon and Sloane for not asking 
them. That is simply not the book that they set out to write. I seek here only to 
highlight a dimension of the inquiry that lies outside the scope of the book. After 
all, if I stayed entirely within the scope of the book, this review likely would 
have ended with the first sentence of the second paragraph. 
 
 
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 304, 306-09 (2007). 
66 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 151-52 (2004). 
67 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 242 (1996). 
